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YIKES! WAS I WRONG? A SECOND LOOK AT THE 
VIABILITY OF MONITORING CAPITAL POST-
CONVICTION COUNSEL 
Celestine Richards McConville* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
When Albert Holland’s capital post-conviction counsel filed his state post-
conviction motion in September 2002, twelve days remained in the one-year statute 
of limitations for filing a federal habeas petition.1  While Holland might not have 
known exactly how much time was left in the federal limitations period, he knew 
that he wanted to preserve his right to federal review,2 that the limitations period 
was tolled during non-discretionary state post-conviction review,3 and that he 
would be under the gun to get the federal petition filed once the Florida Supreme 
Court issued its decision.4  And he made no bones about his desire to file a timely 
federal petition, sending his attorney several letters to that effect, and even sending 
accurate legal citations.5  Reading those letters (and several others he wrote in an 
attempt to get information on his case), one can sense Holland’s mounting fear that 
he might actually miss the federal filing deadline and, along with it, the opportunity 
for federal review of his constitutional claims. 
Holland’s fear became reality.  Counsel not only failed to immediately inform 
Holland of the Florida Supreme Court’s decision and December 1, 2005 mandate 
(which re-started the federal limitations period), but he also failed to file a federal 
                                                                                                                 
 * Professor of Law, Chapman University School of Law.  B.A. 1988, Boston University; J.D. 
1991 Georgetown University Law Center.  I would like to thank Lisa M.J. Spillman and the California 
Appellate Defense Counsel for inviting me to speak at the Counsel’s 2011 Annual Meeting, as this 
project is an outgrowth of that presentation.  Thanks also to  Scott Howe for our continuing dialogues on 
the issues addressed in the article, and to Tom McConville for his unwavering support.  As always, any 
errors are my own. 
 1. A Florida court appointed post-conviction counsel to represent Holland 37 days after his 
conviction became final.  Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct 2549, 2555 (2010).  Counsel filed Holland’s 
state post-conviction petition 316 days later, leaving 12 days in the one-year federal limitations period.  
Id.    
 2. Joint Appendix at 210, 212, 214, 216, 222, Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct 2549 (2010) (No. 09-
5327) [hereinafter Joint Appendix] (letters from Holland to counsel indicating desire to file timely 
federal habeas petition). 
 3. Id. at 216, 220 (letters from Holland to counsel explaining that one-year limitations period is not 
tolled during certiorari review of state post-conviction decision). 
 4. In a letter dated January 9, 2006, Holland asked his lawyer to “send me a copy of said 
‘Mandate,’ so that I can determine when the deadline will be to file my 28 U.S.C. Rule [sic] 2254 
Federal Habeas Corpus Petition, in accordance with all United States Supreme Court and Eleventh 
Circuit case law and applicable ‘Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act,’ if my appeals before 
the Supreme Court of Florida are denied.”  Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 214.  See id. at 210, 212 
(requesting information regarding status of case and requesting timely filing of federal habeas petition); 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556-59 (reciting letters from Holland to counsel).   
 5. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 210, 212, 214, 216; see id. at 222 (letter dated February 9, 2006 
reminding counsel of Holland’s prior requests to file timely federal habeas petition).  
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habeas petition within the remaining twelve-day window.6  And even though 
Holland urged him to file a petition within the limitations period, counsel 
“appear[ed] to have been unaware of the date on which the limitations period 
expired,” and “apparently did not do the research necessary to find out the proper 
filing date despite Holland’s letters that went so far as to identify the applicable 
legal rules.”7  Holland ultimately discovered the Florida Supreme Court’s decision 
in mid-January 2006 during a shift in the prison law library.8  Holland immediately 
filed a pro se federal habeas petition,9 which the federal district court denied as 
untimely.10  
While counsel’s failure to file a timely federal petition is striking given 
Holland’s many reminders to keep on top of the matter, equally striking is the 
Florida Supreme Court’s failure to do anything to prevent the untimely filing.  The 
Florida Supreme Court, like all Florida courts that entertain capital post-conviction 
motions, has a statutory obligation to “monitor the performance of assigned counsel 
to ensure that the capital defendant is receiving quality representation.”11  
Moreover, Holland did not hesitate to share his feelings about counsel’s 
                                                                                                                 
 6. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556-57.  Holland repeatedly asked counsel for information regarding 
“the status of my case . . . on appeal to the Supreme Court of Florida.”  Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 
210; see id. at 212, 214. 
 7. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564. 
 8. Id. at 2557. 
 9. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 83 (referencing filing date); Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 10. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 81-94; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2559. 
 11. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.711(12) (West 2011).  The Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged the 
obligation to monitor post-conviction counsel.  See, e.g., Coleman v. State, 930 So. 2d 580, 581 (2006) 
(invoking monitoring statute, court ordered counsel to file response to allegation challenging counsel’s 
conduct); id. (recognizing that “the Legislature has charged the courts with closely monitoring the 
services provided by registry counsel.”) (Anstead, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Ventura 
v. State, 2 So. 3d 194, 201 (2009) (exercising “supervisory authority under section 27.711(12) to 
monitor whether postconviction counsel is providing ‘quality representation.’”); In re Amendment to 
Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure-Rule 3.112 Minimum Standards for Attorneys in Capital Cases, 
820 So. 2d 185, 188-89 (2002) (recognizing that “the Legislature has  . . . provid[ed] for judicial 
oversight and monitoring of assigned counsel’s performance in postconviction proceedings.”).    
  It is unclear whether the monitoring obligation extends only to registry counsel (i.e. private 
counsel) or to all capital post-conviction counsel, including attorneys employed by the Capital Collateral 
Regional Counsel – a state entity dedicated to providing capital collateral representation.  See infra note 
58 and accompanying text.  The provision of section 27.711 dealing with monitoring uses the term 
“assigned counsel,” FLA. STAT. ANN. §27.711(12), which could be interpreted to include anyone 
assigned to represent the capital petitioner.  But almost all other provisions of section 27.711 either 
specifically reference attorneys appointed under section 27.710 – registry attorneys – or deal with issues 
relating to registry attorneys (such as fees).  See FLA. STAT. ANN. §27.711(1)(a), (2)-(4), (6), (8), (11).  
For purposes of this article, however, the issue is irrelevant because Holland’s counsel is a registry 
attorney.  See Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555 (noting counsel’s appointment by the court and citing sections 
27.710 and 27.711); Registry Attorney, COMMISSION ON CAPITAL CASES, 
http://www.floridacapitalcases.state.fl.us/c-registry-attorney.cfm (last visited May 13, 2012) (listing 
Holland’s counsel as current registry attorney); cf. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 54, 57, 63 (using 
private letter head to communicate with client). 
  One might argue that in cases where there are no outward signs of problems, a court might not 
think to inquire into the depth of counsel’s knowledge regarding filing deadlines.  But as explained 
infra, the monitoring obligation triggers such a duty, regardless of whether there are outward signs of 
problems. 
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performance with the Florida Supreme Court (and several others).12  In 2004, he 
sent two motions to the Florida Supreme Court requesting that counsel be removed, 
leveling allegations not only about counsel’s failure to include certain claims in the 
state habeas petition,13 but also about counsel’s failure “to establish any 
relationship of trust or confidence” with Holland,14 his failure to communicate with 
Holland,15 his “abandon[ment]” of Holland,16 and Holland’s lack of trust and 
confidence in counsel.17     
After the second removal motion, the Florida Supreme Court ordered 
responses from the State of Florida and Holland’s counsel.18  Ultimately, the court 
denied the motion, agreeing with the State that Holland could not file pro se 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2565 (Holland “repeatedly contacted the state courts, their clerks, and the 
Florida State Bar Association in an effort to have [counsel] . . . removed from his case.”). 
 13. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 134-35.  Under Florida law, the state post-conviction motion 
and the state habeas petition are separate.  The post-conviction motion is the primary method of 
collateral attack, and is filed in the trial court.  See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.851.  The state habeas petition is 
filed in the Florida Supreme Court along with the appeal from the denial of the post-conviction motion, 
FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.851(d)(3), and contains claims that were not, and could not be, raised on direct 
review or in the post-conviction motion.  Barwick v. Buss, 2011 WL 2566310, at *14 (Fla. June 30, 
2011) (“[b]ecause every argument raised in this portion of appellant’s habeas petition either could have 
been or in fact was raised in his motion [for post-conviction relief] . . . this claim is rejected as 
procedurally barred.”); see also AM. BAR ASSOC., EVALUATING FAIRNESS AND ACCURACY IN STATE 
DEATH PENALTY SYSTEMS: THE FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY ASSESSMENT REPORT 217 (2006) 
[hereinafter ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT] (citing Nixon v. State, 932 So.2d 1009 (Fla. 
2006), and describing Florida’s post-conviction process).   
  Holland filed pro se motions attempting to include additional claims to both the initial post-
conviction motion and the state habeas petition.  Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 8-9; id. at 113-21, 
125-33.  Early on in his representation of Holland, counsel correctly and thoroughly explained to 
Holland that some claims simply are not cognizable on collateral review (including many of the claims 
Holland wished to raise) and that, even when a claim is cognizable, it can be counter-productive to raise 
the claim if it lacks merit.  Id. at 54-56 (undated letter from counsel to Holland); id. at 57-62 (letter from 
counsel to Holland dated December 23, 2002).  Nevertheless, in an effort to preserve the claims, counsel 
sought to adopt Holland’s pro se motion to add claims to the post-conviction motion.  Id. at 11-14; see 
id. at 13 (explaining to trial judge that counsel was “filing [his] request to adopt the motion, to the extent 
that down the road you find the grounds justiciable or legally sufficient”).  The trial court rejected 
counsel’s efforts to adopt, and instead struck Holland’s motion as a nullity.  Id.  A few months later, 
counsel successfully supplemented the record with additional material prepared by Holland.  Id. at 17 
(explaining to the trial judge “that as his counsel, I had filed what I thought to be the appropriate 
grounds.  Albert has some of his own things he wants to raise.  I think I would like it to be incorporated 
as part of the record.”). 
 14. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 137 (February 18, 2004 Motion to Remove Conflict Counsel). 
 15. Id. at 152 (June 14, 2004 Motion to Remove Conflict Counsel). 
 16. Id. at 152. 
 17. Id. at 135, 152.  Holland also sent a letter to the Florida Bar Association raising similar 
allegations, id. at 207, as well as numerous letters to the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court asking for 
documents and information about his case.  Id. at 122-24, 146-48 (letters dated September 8, 2003; 
November 20, 2003; and April 26, 2004); see also Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 
2008) (noting that “[i]n October 2005, [Holland] also contacted the Florida Supreme Court about the use 
of its website ‘so that he could secure the assistance of outside supporters to keep him updated about the 
appeal.’”).  
 18. See Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 44 (referencing the court’s order to respond to Holland’s 
motion). 
2012] SECOND LOOK AT POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL 489 
motions while he was represented by counsel.19  Other than order and review the 
parties’ responses to Holland’s removal motion, it appears the Florida Supreme 
Court did little, if anything, to monitor the quality of counsel’s performance.20  At 
the least, these motions should have reminded the court of its general duty to 
monitor, spurring proactive monitoring of counsel’s performance going forward.21 
Holland’s case ultimately made it to the Supreme Court of the United States, 
which held that the one-year federal limitations period “is subject to equitable 
tolling in appropriate cases.”22  While the Court generally has been unsympathetic 
to claims of error by post-conviction counsel,23 it held that, at least in some 
circumstances, post-conviction counsel’s “professional misconduct . . . could  . . . 
create an extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling.”24  The Court 
declined to characterize Holland’s complaint as a claim of simple negligence, 
instead asserting that the “facts . . . present far more serious instances of attorney 
misconduct”25 and “suggest that this case may well be an ‘extraordinary’ instance 
in which petitioner’s attorney’s conduct constituted far more than ‘garden variety’ 
or ‘excusable neglect.’”26  Indeed, the Court stated that counsel’s failures 
“seriously prejudiced a client who thereby lost what was likely his single 
opportunity for federal habeas review of the lawfulness of his imprisonment and of 
his death sentence.”27  Because the lower court applied too rigid a standard for 
“extraordinary circumstances,” the Court remanded for a determination of whether 
counsel’s conduct met the Court’s more relaxed standard.28   
                                                                                                                 
 19. Id. at 46; see also Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2556 (2010) (interpreting court’s ruling 
as adopting Florida’s position).  The Florida Supreme Court denied the first motion to remove counsel 
on the same ground.  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 20. At the direction of the state legislature, the Auditor General reviewed Florida’s post-conviction 
representation system from July 2003 to June 30, 2006.  Among other things, the Auditor General found 
that “[t]he court’s monitoring of the performance of counsel assigned to capital cases, required by 
Section 27.711(12), . . . has not occurred.”  WILLIAM O. MONROE, CAPITAL COLLATERAL REGIONAL 
COUNSEL PILOT PROGRAM 1 (2007) [hereinafter AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORT] (emphasis added).  
Albert Holland’s case was pending before the Florida Supreme Court during most of the Auditor 
General’s review period (from mid-2003 to December 2005). 
 21. See infra note 102. 
 22. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2560. 
 23. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (“[P]etitioner  . . . must bear the burden of 
[counsel’s] failure to follow state procedural rules.”); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986) (post-
conviction counsel’s failure to raise claim not cause to excuse procedural default); Pennsylvania v. 
Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (no constitutional right to post-conviction counsel); Murray v. Giarratano, 
492 U.S. 1 (1989) (no constitutional right to capital post-conviction counsel); Wainwright v. Torna, 455 
U.S. 586 (1982) (effectiveness guarantee attaches only to constitutional rights to counsel).   
 24. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563.   
 25. Id. at 2564. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. at 2565. 
 28. Id.  The Eleventh Circuit held that even “gross negligence” will not warrant equitable tolling 
absent “allegation and proof of bad faith, dishonesty, divided loyalty, mental impairment or so forth.”  
Holland v. Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1339 (11th Cir. 2008).  Characterizing the Eleventh Circuit’s 
standard as “too rigid,” the Supreme Court held that “at least sometimes, professional misconduct that 
fails to meet the Eleventh Circuit’s standard could nonetheless amount to egregious behavior and create 
an extraordinary circumstance that warrants equitable tolling.”  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563.  The 
Eleventh Circuit remanded to the district court “for fact finding and further proceedings—including, if it 
is necessary, an evidentiary hearing—consistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions.”  Holland v. 
490 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2 
The Court’s decision in Holland is an important one for several reasons.  First, 
it reconfirms two core principles: that equity has deep roots in habeas corpus 
jurisprudence29 and that “habeas corpus plays a vital role in protecting 
constitutional rights.”30  Second, at least with respect to “egregious behavior”31 that 
causes a capital post-conviction petitioner to miss the federal habeas filing 
deadline, Holland deviates from the Court’s traditional rule that a post-conviction 
petitioner must “bear the burden” of her attorney’s errors.32  Third (and relatedly), 
Holland provides the groundwork for reinterpreting (and relaxing) the meaning of 
“cause” in the cause and prejudice standard.33   
                                                                                                                 
Florida, 613 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  On remand, the district court found that counsel’s 
“egregious misconduct, in tandem with Holland’s inability to extricate himself from any prejudice 
caused therefrom, constituted an extraordinary circumstance” that warranted equitable tolling.  Holland 
v. Florida, No. 06-20182 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2010) (order allowing equitable tolling and amended 
petition, and setting briefing schedule).  The district court then allowed Holland to file an amended 
petition, which the court granted in part and denied in part.  Holland v. Tucker, 2012 WL 1193294 (S.D. 
Fla. 2012).   
 29. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2561 (“[H]abeas corpus[] pertains to an area of the law where equity 
finds a comfortable home”); id. at 2560 (“equitable principles have traditionally governed the 
substantive law of habeas corpus . . . .”) (internal quotations omitted). 
 30. Id. at 2562. 
 31. Id. at 2563. 
 32. See, e.g., Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754 (1991) (errors by post-conviction counsel 
do not constitute cause to excuse a procedural default). 
 33. In Holland, the Court attempted to distinguish excusing a procedural default from equitable 
tolling by arguing that the former has to do with federalism in a way the latter does not:   
Coleman was ‘a case about federalism,’ . . . in that it asked whether federal courts may 
excuse a petitioner’s failure to comply with a state court’s procedural rules, 
notwithstanding the state court’s determination that its own rules had been violated.  
Equitable tolling, by contrast, asks whether federal courts may excuse a petitioner’s 
failure to comply with federal timing rules, an inquiry that does not implicate a state 
court’s interpretation of state law. 
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2563.  But this distinction is weak, for both doctrines, when invoked to forgive 
error, inflict federalism injuries on the state in the form of delay.  Whether a case moves forward at the 
federal habeas level because of equitable tolling or a finding of cause (and prejudice) to excuse a state 
procedural default, the state will be forced to endure delay that it otherwise would not have had to 
endure.  The delay will be even longer if the petitioner receives relief at the federal level on the claims 
that went forward as a result of equitable tolling or a finding of cause (and prejudice).  
  The Court’s distinction is also weak because equitable principles (which we know underlie 
habeas) would seem to suggest that if egregious attorney conduct warrants equitable tolling, then that 
same conduct ought to constitute cause for a procedural default.  The reasoning in Justice Alito’s 
concurring opinion shows why this is so:    
Common sense dictates that a litigant cannot be held constructively responsible for the 
conduct of an attorney who is not operating as his agent in any meaningful sense of that 
word . . . . That is particularly so if the litigant’s reasonable efforts to terminate the 
attorney’s representation have been thwarted by forces wholly beyond the petitioner’s 
control. 
Id. at 2568 (Alito, J., concurring).   This “common sense” would seem to apply whether the attorney’s 
error defaulted a state or a federal rule.  Indeed, the Court appeared to recognize as much in its recent 
decision in Maples v. Thomas, which dealt with the question whether attorney conduct can ever 
constitute cause to excuse a state procedural default.  132 S. Ct. 912, 917 (2012).  While acknowledging 
the “general rule” that counsel’s failure to meet a deadline will not constitute cause, the Court noted that 
“[a] markedly different situation is presented . . . when an attorney abandons his client without notice, 
and thereby occasions the default.”  Id. at 922.  In such a case, the Court held, counsel’s conduct 
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But to someone who has argued that states have a constitutional obligation to 
monitor the performance of state-appointed capital post-conviction counsel,34 the 
real significance of Holland lies not in its holding or reasoning, but in its facts, as 
they call into question the efficacy of monitoring as a tool for promoting the 
delivery of competent assistance of counsel.  In the context of capital post-
conviction counsel, Florida literally is a pioneer:  unlike other death states, it 
explicitly requires capital post-conviction courts to monitor capital post-conviction 
counsel “to ensure that the capital defendant is receiving quality representation.”35  
Yet despite this obligation, the Florida Supreme Court failed to spot a major (and 
preventable) error – the failure to properly calculate and meet the deadline for 
filing a federal habeas corpus petition.  Florida’s experience with its own 
monitoring requirement, as evidenced in particular (but not exclusively)36 by the 
facts in Holland, raise a question about the utility of monitoring as a means of 
enhancing competent performance.  Perhaps this author was wrong (yikes!), and 
monitoring is simply ineffective as a means of enhancing competent assistance.  Or 
perhaps the problem lies elsewhere, such as with Florida’s implementation of the 
monitoring requirement.    
This article explores the reasons for – and thus the meaning of – the 
monitoring failure in Holland.  It begins in Part II with a description of Florida’s 
efforts to provide competent post-conviction counsel to capital petitioners, and a 
more detailed account of Holland’s post-conviction odyssey.  Part III briefly 
explains the scope of the monitoring requirement, as well as the three essential 
elements of a constitutionally meaningful monitoring program (elements the 
American Bar Association (“ABA”) has recommended for years);37  (1) a 
monitoring entity with expertise in post-conviction litigation and a commitment to 
the goals of monitoring; (2) a well-designed structure detailing precisely how the 
                                                                                                                 
constitutes cause for the procedural default.  Id. at 924.  As support for its conclusion, the Court cited 
Justice Alito’s “common sense” language and reasoning.  Id. at 923. 
  Shortly after Maples, the Court issued yet another decision relaxing the cause standard.  In 
Martinez v. Ryan, the Court ruled that ineffective assistance of counsel “at initial-review collateral 
proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective assistance 
at trial.”  132 S. Ct. 1309, 1315 (2012). 
 34. This author is such a person.  See Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective 
Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel: Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of 
Capital Counsel, 2003 WIS. L. REV. 31, 104-110 (2003) [hereinafter McConville, Constitutional 
Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel] (arguing that the decision to provide capital post-
conviction counsel triggers constitutional obligation to monitor performance of counsel); Celestine 
Richards McConville, Protecting the Right to Effective Assistance of Capital Postconviction Counsel:  
The Scope of the Constitutional Obligation to Monitor Counsel Performance, 66 U. PITT. L. REV. 521 
(2005) [hereinafter McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor] (explaining scope of 
constitutional monitoring obligation). 
 35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.711(12) (West 2011). 
 36. See ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 183 (noting that “registry 
attorneys in at least twelve separate cases filed their clients’ state post-conviction motions or federal 
habeas corpus petitions between two months to three years after the applicable filing deadline.”). 
 37. See Am. Bar Assoc., Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in 
Death Penalty Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 913, 944-51 (2003), (Guideline 3.1, discussing 
characteristics of monitoring entity) [hereinafter 2003 ABA Guidelines]; id at 970-73 (Guideline 7.1, 
discussing monitoring requirement and need for “systematic review based upon publicized standards 
and procedures”).  
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monitoring entity should exercise the monitoring function; and (3) actual use of 
that structure by the monitoring entity to identify conduct that has undermined, or 
could undermine, the delivery of effective assistance.  
Part III then demonstrates how Florida’s monitoring system fails to meet these 
elements.   Although the Florida Supreme Court has acknowledged the general 
authority to monitor,38 and through its then-Chief Justice has identified monitoring 
as a possible solution to the problem of poor lawyering by post-conviction 
counsel,39 the Florida courts have not engaged in the statutorily required 
monitoring.40  So while the courts possess the necessary expertise, their failure to 
monitor strongly suggests a lack of commitment to the monitoring enterprise.  
Moreover, neither the legislature nor the courts have established a structure for 
exercising the monitoring obligation, and this lack of structure not only makes it 
difficult to effectively and thoroughly monitor counsel’s performance for signs of 
problems, but also decreases the likelihood that the courts will actually engage in 
monitoring.    
In Albert Holland’s case, the Florida Supreme Court arguably engaged in 
(limited) monitoring – ordering responses to Holland’s removal motion and 
reviewing the relevant filings from the parties.  Had the Florida Supreme Court 
utilized proper monitoring techniques, such as periodic conferences or check-lists 
to actively monitor the basic aspects of counsel’s performance – including 
counsel’s understanding or awareness of the federal statute of limitations – the odds 
are quite high that it could have prevented counsel from missing the federal 
deadline.     
So what are the lessons from Holland?  First, the ABA and other observers 
were correct about not using the judiciary as the monitoring entity.  Going forward, 
the monitoring function must be performed by an independent entity that is 
dedicated to improving the performance of capital post-conviction counsel.  The 
training, expertise and focus of such an entity will improve the quality of the 
monitoring, making it more likely that the entity will catch needless errors and 
problems.41  Second, either the state legislature or the monitoring entity must 
establish a detailed structure for monitoring, including timelines, mechanisms for 
gathering information (conferences or checklists), guidelines for identifying the 
signs of actual or potential incompetent performance, and remedies for problems 
detected during monitoring.42  And third, though it should go without saying, the 
monitoring entity must actually use that structure to search for signs of actual or 
potential problems with counsel’s performance.43  With a dedicated entity, a clear 
structure, and a pro-active stance, monitoring remains an efficacious tool in 
promoting the delivery of competent assistance of post-conviction counsel.    
                                                                                                                 
 38.  See supra note 11. 
 39.  See Jan Pudlow, Justice Rips Shoddy Work of Private Capital Case Lawyers, Current 
Standards for Post-Conviction Counsel Are “Inadequate,” FLA. BAR NEWS, March 1, 2005, at 3 
(statement by then-Chief Justice Barbara Pariente “endors[ing] . . . a continuing system of screening and 
monitoring to ensure minimum levels of competence.”). 
 40. See infra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. 
 41. See infra notes 120-36 and accompanying text. 
 42. See infra notes 169-79 and accompanying text. 
 43. See 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37, at 970 (Guideline 7.1). 
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II.  THE FLORIDA EXPERIMENT 
A.  Efforts to Provide Competent Post-Conviction Counsel 
In the area of capital post-conviction counsel, Florida is a pioneer.  In 1985, 
several years before Congress funded capital post-conviction defender 
organizations,44 Florida established and funded the Office of the Capital Collateral 
Representative (CCR), the nation’s first state-funded entity dedicated to 
representing capital petitioners seeking state post-conviction review.45  Equally 
important, in 1999 it became the first state to explicitly require post-conviction 
courts to monitor counsel’s performance “to ensure that the capital defendant is 
receiving quality representation.”46  And while the American Bar Association and 
others have long endorsed monitoring as a means of enhancing effective 
performance,47 Florida appears to be the only state to impose a statutory monitoring 
obligation.48  To be sure, its leadership in the area of capital post-conviction 
representation is a source of great pride.  As Harry Lee Anstead, then Chief Justice 
of the Florida Supreme Court explained to a committee of the state legislature, 
“Florida is without any doubt the No. 1 state in this country for its post-conviction 
proceedings in death penalty cases.”49 
But all that glitters is not gold.  Complaints began to surface regarding delay 
(and other) tactics allegedly practiced by CCR attorneys, which in turn led to the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See Roscoe C. Howard, Jr., Symposium, Federalism and the Criminal Justice System: The 
Defunding of the Post Conviction Defense Organizations as a Denial of the Right to Counsel, 98 W. VA. 
L. REV. 863, 865 (1996) (“Post Conviction Defender Organizations  . . . were created by Congress in 
1988 to provide a service that would identify, train and support competent death penalty counsel in state 
and federal proceedings.”); see id. at 906-09 (explaining creation of post-conviction defender 
organizations). 
 45. Mark E. Olive, Capital Post-Conviction Representation Models: Lessons from Florida, 34 AM. 
J. CRIM. L. 277, 278 (2007) (Office of the Capital Collateral Representative was “the country’s first 
statewide, state-funded, capital post-conviction defense office. . . .  These Florida developments were 
astonishing in 1985.”).  For a detailed description of developments in Florida’s post-conviction counsel 
provisions, see generally id. at 287-90; ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 136-
242; Olive, supra note 45, at 287-290. 
 46. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.711(12) (West 2011); McConville, Constitutional Implications of 
Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel, supra note 34, at 66. 
 47. See 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37, at 970 (Guideline 7.1, recommending monitoring of 
counsel “to ensure that the client is receiving high quality legal representation”); AM. BAR ASSOC. 
STANDING COMM. ON LEGAL AID AND INDIGENT DEFENDANTS, TEN PRINCIPLES OF A PUBLIC DEFENSE 
DELIVERY SYSTEM 3 (2002) (recommending supervision of defense counsel in principle 10). 
 48. See McConville, Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel, supra note 
34, at 66. 
 49. Jan Pudlow, The Pros and Cons of Privatizing Death Penalty Appeals, FLA. BAR NEWS, March 
1, 2003, at 1 (quoting Chief Justice Harry Lee Anstead); see id. (“We are called constantly by other 
states, and it’s all because the legislature has created and funded a system that assures high quality 
review in those cases.”); REPORT ON STUDY OF POSTCONVICTION REPRESENTATION OF DEATH ROW 
INMATES 2 (February 13, 1997) [hereinafter MCDONALD COMMISSION REPORT] (Feb. 13, 1997) 
(“Based on a survey prepared by the Attorney General, the Commission believes the State of Florida 
currently provides the most comprehensive system for providing legal services to already convicted 
death-row inmates.”). 
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creation of the McDonald Commission50 to study the representation provided to 
capital post-conviction petitioners in the State of Florida.51   In its February 1997 
Report, the Commission found that although the CCR had been successful in 
numerous cases and provided “a valuable resource” to private attorneys who 
represented death row inmates, fourteen capital inmates lacked representation 
despite an increase in the CCR’s budget and staffing.52  The Commission also 
found that the CCR engaged in “abusive public-records requests” and “improper 
litigation tactics.”53  To help resolve these problems, the Commission 
recommended two different approaches – either decentralize the CCR into regional 
offices or move post-conviction representation to the Public Defender.54   The 
former approach would facilitate representation in the event of a conflict of interest 
caused by multiple defendants, “promote professionalism,” and reduce delay 
caused by travel and scheduling conflicts.55  The latter approach would put 
representation in the hands of “experts in criminal law.”56  The legislature opted for 
the former approach and in 1997 created the Capital Collateral Regional Counsel 
(CCRC) with three regional offices – northern, middle, and southern.57  It also 
created the Commission on Capital Cases to oversee the CCRCs.58    
A few years later, to save money and improve efficiency, the legislature 
considered eliminating the CCRCs and moving to a system comprised entirely of 
private attorneys.59  Perhaps heeding warnings that moving to such a system would 
actually increase both costs and delays,60 in 2003 the legislature instituted a “pilot 
                                                                                                                 
 50. The McDonald Commission was named after the Chair of the Commission, Justice Parker Lee 
McDonald.  See MCDONALD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 49, at 11. 
 51. Id. at 1.  
 52. Id. at 2. 
 53. Id. at 3. 
 54. Id. at 6-7. 
 55. Id. at 6. 
 56. Id. at 7. 
 57. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.701(1) (West 2011).  Each regional office is headed by a “regional 
counsel” appointed by the Governor and confirmed by the Senate.  Id. 
 58. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.709(2)(a) (West 2011).  The state legislature eliminated the Commission 
on Capital Cases in 2011.  2011 Fla. Laws 2011-131 § 1.   Before its elimination, the Commission had 
many functions, including “review[ing] the operation of the [CCRC] and private counsel,” and receiving 
complaints about CCRC and registry attorneys.   FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.709(2)(a), (c) (2006), repealed 
by 2011 Fla. Laws 2011-131 § 1.  The Executive Director of the Commission on Capital Cases recruited 
attorneys for the registry and maintained the registry.  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.710(1) (2006), repealed by 
2011 Fla. Laws 2011-131 §1.   
  The Justice Administrative Commission, which handles budgetary and accounting matters for 
the CCRCs and public defender offices, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 43.16 (West 2011), is now charged with 
maintaining the post-conviction registry of private counsel.  2011 Fla. Laws 2011-131 §§ 2, 4, 5; see 
also COMMISSION ON CAPITAL CASES, http://www.floridacapitalcases.state.fl.us/#index (last visited 
March 28, 2012) (noting that the Commission ceased operations effective June 30, 2011); Capital 
Collateral Registry, THE JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION, http://www.justiceadmin.org (last 
visited March 26, 2012). 
 59. See generally Pudlow, supra note 49; Olive, supra note 45, at 288.     
 60. See generally Pudlow, supra note 49 (discussing problems with relying on “network of private 
attorneys” to handle capital collateral proceeds); Pudlow, supra note 39, at 1 (discussing February 16, 
2005 meeting of Senate Committee on Justice Appropriations, in which Senator Crist said:  “In the 
astute wisdom of the Senate, we decided to slow it down and do a test and that’s how [the pilot 
program] . . . came about.”). 
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program” that eliminated only one CCRC – the northern region – and replaced it 
with representation by private attorneys listed on a special registry.61  The 
legislature ordered the State Auditor General to review the program for 
“effectiveness and efficiency,” with a particular focus on a comparison between the 
CCRCs and the registry attorneys in terms of “timeliness and costs.”62 The Auditor 
General’s 2007 Report covered the period from July 1, 2003 through June 30, 
2006.63  The Report found that “the [CCRC] system [was] significantly more costly 
than the use of the registry attorneys,” but that the difference in costs resulted 
partly from “the administrative costs of the CCRC,” as well as from the significant 
amount of time and resources spent by the CCRC attorneys while working the 
cases.64   For two of the fiscal years studied, “the CCRCs provided an average of 
355 hours of legal counsel per case and the registry attorneys provided an average 
of 196 hours per case.”65  In terms of timeliness, the Report noted that “[u]seful 
comparisons as to timeliness” were hard to make given the “varying circumstances 
that can impact the length of time required to complete the case.”66  Nevertheless, 
the study showed that the amount of collateral appeal time spent “under the direct 
control of the CCRC and registry attorneys” was about the same.67  In terms of 
quality and effectiveness, the Report found that the CCRCs experienced “a higher 
incidence of success” than registry attorneys.68  Tellingly, the Report also noted 
that, despite the statutory requirement for judicial monitoring of counsel’s 
performance, a “system for monitoring . . . has not been established,”69 and “[t]he 
court’s monitoring . . . has not occurred.”70  
Without monitoring, it is not surprising that problems with registry attorneys 
eventually began to surface.  Sub-par performance did not go unnoticed by the 
Florida Supreme Court, which, as Mark Olive71 aptly observed, is “in the best 
position to review the work product submitted by Registry attorneys on a daily 
                                                                                                                 
 61. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.701(2) (West 2011).  Only attorneys listed on the special state registry 
could participate in the pilot program.  Id.  To get on the registry, which is now compiled by the 
executive director of the Justice Administrative Commission, Id. § 27.710 (West 2011), attorneys must 
“certif[y] that they meet the minimum requirements” set forth in section 27.704(2), that they “are 
available  . . .  to represent” capital post-conviction petitioners, and that they “have attended within the 
last year a continuing legal education program of at least 10 hours’ duration devoted specifically to the 
defense of capital cases . . . .” Id. § 27.710(1). 
62.Id. § 27.701(2).  In 2004, the legislature decided to continue the program beyond the initial year.  Id. 
 63. AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 20, at 1. It also covered “selected actions through 
November 30, 2006.”  Id.  
 64. Id. at 9. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 14. 
 67. Id. at 11 (stating that the length of time is “2.0 years for CCRC cases and 2.1 years for registry 
cases.”). 
 68. Id. at 15.  The CCRCs won 14 favorable judicial decisions, compared to 5 won by registry 
attorneys.  Id.  The Report warned, however, that these numbers could change from year to year, 
particularly given “the length of time that each case spends in the various appellate processes and the 
limited number of cases.”  Id.  
 69. Id. at 16. 
 70. Id. at 1. 
 71. Mr. Olive “is an attorney in private practice [who] . . . has represented death-sentenced inmates 
nation-wide for almost thirty years.”  Olive, supra note 45, at 277 n.1. 
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basis . . . .”72  Justice Raoul Cantero told the Commission on Capital Cases that  
some of the worst lawyering I’ve seen is from some of registry counsel, 
unfortunately. . . .  It seems to me some registry counsel have little or no 
experience in death penalty cases.  They have not raised the right issues . . 
. .  Sometimes, they raise too many issues and still they haven’t raised the 
right ones.  In arguments, they are unable to respond to questions or don’t 
know what the record shows.  They don’t have a real good understanding 
of death penalty cases, I don’t think.73 
Then-Chief Justice Barbara Pariente echoed the thought, stating that “we have 
observed deficiencies” with registry counsel.74  The ABA has weighed in as well.  
In 2006 the American Bar Association Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation 
Project75 published a report on Florida’s death penalty system noting that “registry 
attorneys in at least twelve separate cases filed their clients’ state post-conviction 
motions or federal habeas corpus petitions between two months to three years after 
the applicable filing deadline.”76  Mistakes like these have devastating 
consequences, as they literally can end the petitioner’s opportunity for habeas 
review.77  
Observers agree that lack of experience plays a role in the underwhelming 
performance of some registry attorneys.78  While many registry lawyers have more 
years of criminal experience than CCRC lawyers, the experience tends to be with 
trials, not post-conviction appeals.79  As the ABA noted in its 2006 report, one 
                                                                                                                 
 72. Id. at 288. 
 73. Pudlow, supra note 39, at 2. 
 74. Id. at 3.  
 75. The American Bar Association Death Penalty Moratorium Implementation Project (hereinafter 
the Project) was established in 2001.  ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at i.  In 
2003, the Project decided to investigate the death penalty systems in several major death penalty states, 
including Alabama, Arizona, Georgia, Florida, Indiana, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia.  
Id.  The purpose of the investigations was to assess “the extent to which they achieve fairness and 
provide due process,” and “highlight individual state systems’ successes and inadequacies.”  Id. 
 76. Id. at 236. 
 77. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731-33 (1991) (claims not presented properly in state 
court will be procedurally defaulted on federal habeas); 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (2012) (successive 
federal petitions will be dismissed unless they fall within an exception); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012) 
(federal petitioners must exhaust state remedies). 
 78. ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 236 (“This lack of appellate 
experience may account for the questionable performance by some registry attorneys.”); Pudlow, supra 
note 39, at 2 (“Part of the problem is the low threshold of experience, [Justice] Cantero said.”); Gary 
Blankenship, Registry Lawyers Defended at Committee Meeting, FLA. BAR NEWS, Apr. 1, 2005, at 2 
(comments by Executive Director of Commission on Capital Cases stating that registry lawyers “might 
be extremely competent at trial, but not on appeal.”).  This issue surfaced as a potential problem as early 
as 1997 during the McDonald Commission’s review of Florida’s post-conviction representation system.  
MCDONALD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 49, at 4 (“Private attorneys, who testified, questioned 
whether a privatization model could provide qualified attorneys.  Specifically, it was the consensus that 
private attorneys would not have the special training in the narrow field of death cases . . . .”). 
 79. ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 183 (“The Executive Director of the 
Commission on Capital Cases has noted that while on average, registry attorneys have more experience 
than capital collateral regional counsel, most of their work has been in trials, not appeals.”) (citation 
omitted); Pudlow, supra note 39 (discussing problems with registry counsel performance and lack of 
experience). 
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registry lawyer with capital trial experience stated that “‘[i]t was a terrible mistake 
for me to get involved, and a lot of other lawyers I know who are messing with this 
are having a rough time of it.’”80   
The lack of relevant experience comes as no surprise to observers given that 
Florida law requires only basic criminal law experience.81  To be eligible for the 
registry, attorneys must have at least three “years’ experience in the practice of 
criminal law,” which must include five of the following, in any combination:  
felony jury trials, felony appeals, or capital post-conviction evidentiary hearings.82  
These qualifications are insufficient for post-conviction counsel, for as Justice 
Cantero observed, “[a] felony can be a burglary . . . . Just because you’ve had five 
burglary trials by no means indicates you can handle a post-conviction death 
penalty case.”83   
Ironically, the Florida Supreme Court declined to apply more stringent 
qualifications to capital post-conviction counsel, in part because state law 
“provid[ed] for judicial oversight and monitoring of assigned counsel’s 
performance in postconviction proceedings.”84  This might seem logical if the 
courts were actually engaged in monitoring, but as the Auditor General’s Report 
confirms, they were not.  Had the Florida courts engaged in monitoring, many 
problems with attorney performance – including the missed filing deadline in 
Holland – could have been eliminated.85 
B.  Holland’s Odyssey 
Albert Holland’s 1997 murder conviction and death sentence became final on 
direct review on October 1, 2001, when the Supreme Court of the United States 
                                                                                                                 
 80.  ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 183 (quoting Jo Becker, System 
May Be Slowing, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 17, 2000). 
 81. AMERICAN FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 235 (discussing qualifications 
and performance of registry counsel).  
 82. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.704(1) (West 2011) (attorneys with CCRC); id. § 27.704(2) (registry 
attorneys); id. §27.710(1), (2) (West 2011) (registry attorneys).  
 83. Pudlow, supra note 39, at 2. 
 84. In re Amendment to Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure – Rule 3.112 Minimum Standards for 
Attorneys in Capital Cases, 820 So. 2d 185, 189 (Fla. 2002); id. at 186 (adopting proposed minimum 
standards for capital trial and direct appeal counsel (public defender and privately retained), but 
declining to adopt same proposed standards for capital post-conviction counsel).  The other reasons for 
declining to impose more stringent standards included: (1) the potential disqualification of less 
experienced attorneys who join the CCRCs “from law school and gain expertise in handling these highly 
specialized postconviction proceedings by working with more experienced attorneys in those offices;” 
(2) the statutory nature of the right to counsel; (3) the “explicit standards for assistant collateral capital 
counsel and for conflict counsel” imposed by the legislature; and (4) the primary concern for 
competency at trial and appeal.  Id. at 188-89. 
 85. Florida’s failure to use an independent monitoring entity, as recommended in the ABA 
Guidelines, did not go unnoticed by the ABA during its 2006 assessment of Florida’s capital 
punishment system.  ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 192.  But what seemed 
to bother the ABA more than that was the lack of action by state actors in the face of known problems:  
“We note that regardless of whether the current reliance on the judicial appointment and monitoring of 
counsel is responsible, the quality of defense representation remains very uneven, as recognized by the 
Florida Supreme Court, and yet little appears to have been done about it.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
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denied Holland’s certiorari petition.86  Soon thereafter, the State of Florida 
appointed a registry attorney to serve as Holland’s state and federal post-conviction 
counsel.87  In September 2002, counsel filed the state post-conviction motion, 
which tolled the federal statute of limitations with twelve days remaining.88   
At some point during state post-conviction review, “relations between 
[counsel] and Holland began to break down,”89 and Holland freely expressed his 
dissatisfaction.90  In February 2004, while the case was pending before the Florida 
Supreme Court, he filed a motion requesting removal of counsel, leveling 
allegations about counsel’s failure to include certain claims in the state habeas 
petition91 and counsel’s failure “to establish any relationship of trust or 
confidence”92 with Holland.  The State of Florida opposed the motion, arguing that 
since he had counsel, Holland should not be permitted to file pro se motions.93  The 
                                                                                                                 
 86. Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549, 2555 (2010). 
 87. Id.  Florida law requires appointed counsel to continue representing the petitioner through 
federal habeas review, unless “released by order of the trial court.”  FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.711(2) (West 
2011). 
 88. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 89. Id.  
 90. See id. at 2555-59.  Holland complained to the Florida Supreme Court, the Florida Bar 
Association, and the Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court.  Id.; Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 207 (July 
18, 2003 letter to Florida Bar Association); id. at 122, 123-24, 146-48 (letters to the Clerk of the Florida 
Supreme Court dated September 8, 2003; November 20, 2003; and April 26, 2004); see Holland v. 
Florida, 539 F.3d 1334, 1337 (11th Cir. 2008) (noting that “[i]n October 2005, [Holland] also contacted 
the Florida Supreme Court about the use of its website ‘so that he could secure the assistance of outside 
supporters to keep him updated about the appeal.’”).  In his letter to the Florida Bar Association, 
Holland complained that his post-conviction counsel refused to raise “at least (20) twenty to (25) 
twenty-five legal issues that have merit . . . .”  Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 207.  The Florida Bar 
Association denied the complaint.  Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556.   Holland sent numerous letters to the 
Clerk of the Florida Supreme Court asking for documents and information about his case.  In his first 
letter, Holland asked whether counsel had filed the state post-conviction petition, noting that he had 
written counsel “a letter a couple of months ago but he has not responded to my letter yet.”  Joint 
Appendix, supra note 2, at 122 (letter dated September 8, 2003).  The Clerk responded, indicating that 
the petition had not yet been filed.  Id. at 22 (letter dated September 11, 2003).  In his second letter, 
Holland asked for a copy of a motion filed by the State of Florida, id. at 123 (letter from Holland to 
Clerk dated November 20, 2003), which the Clerk sent to Holland, id. at 25 (letter from Clerk to 
Holland dated December 3, 2003).  In his third letter, Holland asked for copies of four separate filings, 
but this time the Clerk sent a letter stating that Holland would have to pay a total of $77.00 in order to 
obtain copies of the documents.  Id. at 146-47 (letter from Holland to Clerk dated April 26, 2004); id. at 
36 (letter from Clerk to Holland dated May 5, 2004). 
 91. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 134-47 (February 18, 2004 letter to Florida Supreme Court).   
After Holland sent the trial court a letter discussing documents in his case, counsel sent a letter to 
Holland correctly and thoroughly explaining that some claims simply are not cognizable in a post-
conviction motion, and that even if a claim is cognizable, it can be counter-productive to raise the claim 
it if lacks merit.  Id. at 54-56 (undated letter from counsel to Holland).  Holland later filed a motion to 
supplement the record in the trial court, which counsel sought to adopt in an effort to preserve the claims 
and the record.  Id. at 11-14.  The trial court rejected the effort, ruling Holland’s motion a nullity.  Id. at 
14. 
 92. Id. at 137 (February 18, 2004 letter to Florida Supreme Court). 
 93. Id. at 31; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556.  
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Florida Supreme Court struck Holland’s filing, agreeing with the State of Florida.94   
Undeterred, in June 2004 Holland filed a second removal motion with the 
Florida Supreme Court, complaining of his lack of trust and confidence in 
counsel95 and alleging several problems with counsel’s performance, including 
counsel’s failure to raise claims,96 his failure to communicate with Holland,97 his 
failure to send requested documents (including “statements and depositions,” and 
various court filings),98 and his “abandon[ment]” of Holland.99  After the second 
removal motion, the Florida Supreme Court ordered responses from Florida and 
Holland’s counsel.100  Ultimately, however, the court denied the motion, again 
agreeing with Florida that Holland had no right to file pro se motions while he was 
represented by counsel.101  Ordering and reviewing the responses to Holland’s 
second removal motion appears to be the only monitoring performed by the Florida 
Supreme Court.102   
From the beginning of state post-conviction review, Holland reminded counsel 
to preserve his claims for federal review.103  Early on, counsel responded to 
Holland, indicating that he was on top of the matter.104  In the months before the 
Florida Supreme Court issued its decision, Holland sent two letters to counsel 
inquiring about his case and reminding counsel of his desire to file a timely federal 
petition,105 both of which went unanswered.106  Unbeknownst to Holland, the 
Supreme Court issued its decision in November 2005 and its mandate on December 
1, 2005, which meant the deadline for filing his federal habeas petition would 
expire twelve days later, on December 13, 2005.107  That date came and went 
without a habeas filing.108  
Uninformed about the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in his case (and his 
missed filing deadline), Holland sent a letter to counsel in January 2006 reiterating 
                                                                                                                 
 94. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556 (“The State responded that Holland could not file any pro se papers 
with the court while he was represented by counsel, including papers seeking new counsel.  The Florida 
Supreme Court agreed and denied Holland’s requests.”) (internal citations omitted).  
 95. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 135, 152. 
 96. Id. at 152-53. 
 97. Id. at 152; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 98. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 152. 
 99. Id.  
 100. Id. at 44 (referencing Florida Supreme Court’s July 7, 2004 Order). 
 101. Id. at 44-46; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556.   
 102. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.  While the court did not address the merits of 
Holland’s complaints about counsel, had it done so, it likely would have rejected them.  See infra note 
180.  The monitoring problem in Holland did not involve the Florida Supreme Court’s rejection of the 
removal motions; it involved its failure to engage in proactive monitoring regarding counsel’s duty to 
file a timely federal habeas petition.  The removal motions, however, should have prodded the court to 
monitor counsel’s performance going forward. 
 103. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 104. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 55, 61; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2555. 
 105. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 210 (letter dated March 3, 2005); id. at 212 (letter dated June 
15, 2005); Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 106. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 107. Id.  
 108. Id. at 2556-57. 
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his request for information and his desire for a timely federal petition.109  Shortly 
thereafter, during a shift in the prison library, Holland discovered that the Florida 
Supreme Court had rendered a decision in his case.110  The very next day, he filed a 
pro se federal habeas corpus petition with the federal district court,111 which the 
district court ultimately denied as untimely.112   
Almost two months after the Florida Supreme Court’s decision, counsel sent 
Holland a letter informing Holland that he would file a certiorari petition with the 
Supreme Court of the United States.113  Holland hurriedly wrote back, correctly 
informing counsel that the certiorari petition would not toll the federal statute of 
limitations.114  Holland followed up with a collect call to counsel, but the office did 
not accept the charges.115  Counsel responded to Holland by letter, explaining his 
belief that the statute of limitations expired years earlier, before he was appointed 
to the case.116  Holland wrote back, correctly explaining when the one-year 
limitations period actually began to run and that it was tolled when counsel filed 
the state post-conviction petition in 2002.117  He also vented:  
 
[Y]ou never told me that my time ran out (expired).  I told you to timely 
file my 28 U.S.C. [§] 2254 Habeas Corpus Petition before the deadline, so 
that I would not be time-barred. 
You never informed me of oral arguments or of the Supreme Court of 
Florida’s November 10, 2005 decision denying my postconviction 
appeals.  You never kept me informed about the status of my case, 
although you told me that you would immediately inform me of the courts 
[sic] decision as soon as you heard anything. . . . . 
Your letter is the first time that you have ever mentioned anything to me 
about my time had [sic] run out, before you were appointed to represent 
me, and that my one-year started to run on October 5, 2000.118 
 
The Supreme Court of the United States, reviewing Holland’s case on 
certiorari to determine whether to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling, described 
counsel’s conduct in this way: 
To be sure, [counsel] failed to file Holland’s petition on time and appears 
to have been unaware of the date on which the limitations period expired . 
. . .  [Counsel] failed to file Holland’s federal petition on time despite 
Holland’s many letters that repeatedly emphasized the importance of his 
                                                                                                                 
 109. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 214 (“Please be advised that I want to preserve my privilege to 
federal review of all of my state convictions and sentences.”); Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557.  
 110. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557. 
 111. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 84, 181-91; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557.  
 112. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 81-94; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2559. 
 113. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 216 (Holland’s letter to counsel referencing an earlier letter 
sent to him from counsel). 
 114. Id. at 216; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557 (“Holland was right about the law.”). 
 115. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 218; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 116. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 78; Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2557-58.  
 117. Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 222. 
 118. Id. at 222-23.  Following Holland’s motion to remove counsel, the federal district court allowed 
counsel to withdraw and appointed new counsel to represent Holland during federal habeas review.  
Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2559. 
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doing so.  [He] apparently did not do the research necessary to find out the 
proper filing date, despite Holland’s letters that went so far as to identify 
the applicable legal rules.  [He] failed to inform Holland in a timely 
manner about the crucial fact that the Florida Supreme Court had decided 
his case, again despite Holland’s many pleas for that information.119 
This conduct occurred while the Florida Supreme Court was supposed to be 
monitoring counsel’s performance.  
III.  LESSONS FROM HOLLAND:  THE EFFICACY OF MONITORING 
A.  The Duty to Monitor 
Despite the importance and complexity of post-conviction proceedings, the 
Supreme Court long ago held that the Constitution provides no right to post-
conviction counsel – not even for capital petitioners.120  Adding insult to injury, the 
Court has also held that even if a state decides to provide counsel as a matter of 
statutory grace, the post-conviction petitioner does not have a right to effective 
assistance of that counsel,121 which means that post-conviction petitioners must 
suffer the consequences of counsel’s mistakes.122  I believe (and have argued) that 
the Court got that second holding wrong.  Specifically, I have argued that a state’s 
decision to provide capital post-conviction counsel as a matter of statutory grace 
triggers a due-process based obligation to ensure that the right is meaningful.123  
And in the context of capital post-conviction counsel, meaningfulness requires two 
things: adherence to rigorous competency standards and supervision of counsel by 
monitoring her performance to prevent, to the extent possible, obvious errors.124    
Because monitoring is necessary to protect the statutory right to capital post-
conviction counsel, the system of monitoring established by the state must also be 
constitutionally meaningful – which means it must be designed in a manner that 
                                                                                                                 
 119. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564. 
 120. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987) (no right to post-conviction counsel); Murray v. 
Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1 (1989) (no right to capital post-conviction counsel).  For a discussion explaining 
the narrowness of Giarratano, see Eric Freedman, Giarratano is a Scarecrow:  The Right to Counsel in 
State Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079, 1086 (2006) (“To read 
Giarratano as holding that states have no obligation to provide postconviction counsel to death row 
inmates is to misread it.”).   
 121. Wainwright v. Torna, 455 U.S. 586 (1982) (effectiveness guarantee attaches only to 
constitutional rights to counsel).  In a recent decision, the Supreme Court of the United States declined 
to decide whether the Constitution provides “a right to effective counsel in collateral proceedings which 
provide the first occasion to raise a claim of ineffective assistance at trial.”  Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 
1309, 1315 (2012). Instead, the Court held that “[i]inadequate assistance of counsel at initial-review 
collateral proceedings may establish cause for a prisoner’s procedural default of a claim of ineffective 
assistance at trial.”  Id. 
 122. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 757 (1991). 
 123. McConville, Constitutional Implications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel, supra note 34, 
at 104-110 (arguing that decision to provide capital post-conviction counsel triggers constitutional 
obligation to monitor performance of counsel). 
 124. Id. at 105.  See also McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, 
at 521-30 (explaining scope of constitutional monitoring obligation). 
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facilitates quality monitoring.125  Accordingly, the monitoring standard must be 
“preventive, not corrective, in nature.”126  Instead of simply “targeting instances of 
actual ineffective assistance,” the monitoring entity “must also target conduct that 
threatens the delivery of effective assistance.”127  Constitutionally meaningful 
monitoring does not involve looking over counsel’s shoulder, second-guessing 
every decision.  Rather, it involves general inquiry regarding “counsel’s 
compliance with the basic duties required of all postconviction counsel”128 – the 
duty to thoroughly investigate the entire case, the duty to raise all meritorious 
claims, and the duty to file a timely petition.129  In Holland’s case, the duty to 
monitor thus included a duty to inquire into counsel’s understanding of how to 
calculate the federal deadline, as a misunderstanding on that score would 
undoubtedly threaten the delivery of effective assistance. 
While monitoring will not catch or prevent all attorney errors, it should catch 
and prevent obvious errors, thereby decreasing the likelihood of ineffective 
assistance.130  Indeed, the extreme deference to state criminal judgments demanded 
by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act on federal habeas review 
“increase[s] the importance of state postconviction proceedings”131 and, hence, the 
need for effective post-conviction counsel.132  
What happened to Albert Holland might suggest that monitoring is an 
inadequate means of protecting the right to post-conviction counsel.  After all, 
unlike other death penalty states, Florida not only required the state post-conviction 
courts to monitor counsel’s performance,133 but also relied on monitoring as “the 
sole method of assuring adequacy of representation . . . .”134  Moreover, the Florida 
Supreme Court on several occasions recognized its general obligation in this 
regard.135  If errors like the one in Holland could not be prevented in Florida, then 
perhaps monitoring is not all that I cracked it up to be.  But as explained below, the 
monitoring failure in Holland actually had nothing to do with monitoring as a 
concept; instead, it had everything to do with Florida’s failure to meet the first two 
                                                                                                                 
 125. McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 543-44 (“[T]he 
system created to monitor capital postconviction counsel must be adequate and effective – it must 
protect the right to monitoring and, in turn, the right to effective capital postconviction counsel.”). 
 126. Id. at 564 (discussing preventive standard and citing sources promoting preventive standard).  
 127. Id.   
 128. Id. at 571 (internal citation omitted). 
 129. Id. at 571-89 (discussing basic duties of post-conviction counsel and how to monitor for 
compliance). 
 130. Id. at 569.  
 131. Freedman, supra note 120, at 1098; id. (“By limiting federal habeas corpus review of the factual 
and legal determinations of state courts, AEDPA sought to give state courts the last word on questions 
of both guilt and sentence – and the last word on the state level is spoken during the postconviction 
process.”).  See also Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Part II:  Report to the ALI Concerning 
Capital Punishment, 89 TEX. L. REV. 367, 415 (2010) (“States have essentially the first and last 
opportunity to focus on the constitutional merits of inmates’ claims.  After that review, the many years 
of legal wrangling is primarily spent navigating the procedural maze and deferential forum that federal 
habeas has become.”). 
 132. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 120, at 1098-1101.  
 133. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.711(12) (West 2011). 
 134. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.7002(2) (West 2011) (emphasis added). 
 135. See generally supra note 11. 
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(of three) basic elements necessary to make any monitoring system constitutionally 
meaningful: a trained monitoring entity committed to the monitoring enterprise and 
a properly designed system for exercising the monitoring obligation.   Florida’s 
failure to meet these two elements virtually guaranteed failure of the third element 
– actual use of the monitoring system – for without the proper entity and an 
established monitoring system, monitoring (of any sort) is unlikely to occur.136    
B.  Cause of the Monitoring Failure in Holland 
1.  Lack of a Trained Monitoring Entity Committed to the Enterprise 
Because “the monitoring process is really one of detection, intervention, and 
prevention,”137 the members of the monitoring entity must be experts in capital 
post-conviction litigation.138  Specifically, they must have training and experience 
sufficient to identify the signs of actual or potential failure to comply with the basic 
duties of capital post-conviction counsel – the duty to investigate, the duty to raise 
all non-frivolous claims, and the duty to file a timely petition.139  Equally 
important, members of the monitoring entity must understand the role monitoring 
plays in protecting the right to effective post-conviction counsel and be committed 
to that goal.140  Lack of such a commitment undermines the monitoring entity’s 
ability to successfully exercise the monitoring function.141 
The ABA recommends that the entity be “independent of the judiciary”142 to 
“ensure that the capital defense function remains free from political influence.”143  
Other observers have agreed, arguing against using courts as monitoring entities 
because of concerns about, inter alia, interference with the court’s neutrality, lack 
of time and, perhaps worst of all, lack of ability or motivation to properly execute 
the monitoring function.144  After evaluating these criticisms in detail, I 
nevertheless concluded that “lack of confidence in all judges across the country is 
unwarranted at this point.”145  Of course, the question now is whether Florida’s 
experience with judicial monitoring proves otherwise.  And the answer, I think, is 
                                                                                                                 
 136. The ABA has long-recommended these elements.  2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37,at 944-
951 (Guideline 3.1, discussing characteristics of monitoring entity); id at 974 (Guideline 7.1, discussing 
monitoring requirement and need for “systematic review based upon publicized standards and 
procedures”).  
 137. McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 570. 
 138. See 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37, at 945 (Guideline 3.1). 
 139. See id. at 945-46; McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 
571-583 (describing basic duties of capital post-conviction counsel and how to monitor for failure to 
comply with those duties). 
 140. See 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37, at 974 (monitoring entity’s “paramount objective [is 
to] protect[] the rights and interests of the defendant.”). 
 141. Id. at 948 (emphasizing need for entity charged with appointment, training and monitoring to be 
“wholly devoted to fostering high quality legal defense representation”). 
 142. Id. at 944 (Guideline 3.1). 
 143. Id. at 948.  See also Ira P. Robbins, Toward a More Just and Effective System of Review in State 
Death Penalty Cases, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 1, 254-55 (1990). 
 144. McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 549-54 
(describing and discussing criticism of using courts as monitoring entities).  
 145.  Id. at 554. 
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that it does.  I was wrong. 
To be fair to the Florida judiciary, members of the Florida Supreme Court have 
decried the poor performance rendered by some registry attorneys146 and, speaking 
on behalf of the Florida Supreme Court, then-Chief Justice Barbara Pariente 
specifically recognized the importance of monitoring as a possible solution to the 
problem.147  Moreover, there is absolutely no evidence of systemic bias in Florida, 
such as refusal to consider petitions fairly.148  But the cold, hard reality is that 
despite the very clear obligation to monitor and the Florida Supreme Court’s 
recognition of that obligation (and its importance), the Florida post-conviction 
courts are simply failing to do it.  The Auditor General noted the systemic lack of 
monitoring in its 2007 Report,149 and Albert Holland’s case provides but one sad 
example.  Even a registry lawyer (who was the head of the CCRC North before it 
was dissolved) acknowledged the judiciary’s lack of oversight.150  Thus, while the 
Florida judiciary is well-intentioned and sufficiently expert in capital post-
conviction litigation, it appears to lack the commitment to the monitoring enterprise 
that is necessary for a constitutionally meaningful monitoring system.151 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See supra notes 73-74 and accompanying text. 
 147. Pudlow, supra note 39, at 2-3 (explaining by letter to the Executive Director of the Commission 
on Capital Cases that “the court has observed a marked improvement in the representation provided by 
the regional CCRC offices. As for registry counsel, we have observed deficiencies and we would 
definitely endorse . . . a continuing system of screening and monitoring to ensure minimum levels of 
competence.”). 
 148. During its assessment of Florida’s death penalty system, the ABA Assessment Project found no 
evidence that the Florida Supreme Court failed to adequately consider the merits of state post-conviction 
petitions: 
[A] review of Florida Supreme Court opinions reviewing the denial of a rule 3.851 
motion indicates that the Court generally renders opinions addressing the issues of fact 
and law and explaining the basis for the disposition of the asserted claims.  Additionally, 
we were unable to locate any instances of the Florida Supreme Court issuing an 
affirmance without an opinion, and there does not appear to be any rule, statute or case 
law permitting such practice in the Florida Supreme Court. 
ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 231.  
 149. AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 20, at 1 (“The court’s monitoring of the performance 
of counsel assigned to capital cases, required by Section 27.711(12) . . . has not occurred.”) (emphasis 
added); cf. ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 192 (“[R]egardless of whether 
the current reliance on the judicial appointment and monitoring of counsel is responsible, the quality of 
defense representation remains very uneven, as recognized by the Florida Supreme Court, and yet little 
appears to have been done about it.”) (emphasis added). 
 150. Pudlow, supra note 39, at 3 (Mike Reiter, a registry lawyer and former head of CCRC North, 
answered affirmatively when asked by a state legislator if registry lawyers lacked oversight).  In its 2006 
Report, the ABA noted criticism regarding “the judiciary’s ability to successfully monitor attorneys on 
the statewide registry.”  ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 189. 
 151. A comment by a then-Florida Supreme Court Justice suggests that while judges might recognize 
the monitoring obligation, they remain unclear about the meaning and scope of that obligation.  See 
Pudlow, supra note 39, at 1.  Discussing the poor performance of some registry counsel, this Justice 
stated that it is “some of the worst lawyering [he had] ever seen.”  Id. at 2.  Yet that same Justice, when 
asked by a state legislator if he “thought of removing [an incompetent lawyer] from [a] case,” replied:  
“I’ve thought about it.  I’m not sure we can.  We have thought about whether this person should be a 
registry counsel at all.  I think we are reluctant to go to that drastic a step.”  Id. at 3.  Such reluctance is 
puzzling, for while removal is strong medicine, it is unclear why the judiciary would lack that authority 
altogether.  Indeed, Florida post-conviction law appears to contemplate a judicial removal power.  See 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.711(8) (West 2011) (addressing how to handle fee payment in the event “an 
2012] SECOND LOOK AT POST-CONVICTION COUNSEL 505 
Although the lack of an established monitoring system (discussed in the next 
section) surely contributed to the problem, the objections raised by opponents of 
judicial monitoring – the incongruity between monitoring and the judge’s role as a 
neutral, a simple lack of time, and/or a lack of motivation152 – provide other 
possible explanations for the lack of commitment to monitoring.  Monitoring 
counsel’s performance, even for basic signs of incompetence, might cause some 
judges to believe they must step out of their neutral role and act more like an 
advocate.153  So rather than risk acting (or appearing to act) as an advocate, a judge 
might avoid monitoring.  Although I have argued that monitoring can be 
accomplished without engaging in advocacy,154 it appears this argument is more 
theoretical than real.  Instead, it stands to reason that a commitment to monitoring 
is more likely to be present when the monitoring entity views itself as an advocate 
for capital inmates.    
Lack of time also is a plausible explanation for the monitoring failure, given 
the time-consuming nature of monitoring155 and the fact that Florida has the second 
largest death row in the nation.156  And asking another judge to handle the 
monitoring function (proposed by me as a solution to lack of time)157 likely would 
not work given the perception that monitoring requires advocacy.   
But what explains the lack of motivation – particularly in a state that relies on 
monitoring as “the sole method of assuring adequacy of representation?”158  A 
possible explanation is fear of losing an election by appearing “soft on crime,” a 
problem about which Professor Stephen Bright has written extensively.159  Indeed, 
in its 2006 Florida Death Penalty Report the ABA concluded that “politicization of 
both contested and retention judicial elections also greatly affects the judiciary.”160  
                                                                                                                 
attorney is permitted to withdraw or is otherwise removed from representation prior to full performance 
of the duties specified in this section”) (emphasis added); see also id. (“An attorney who withdraws or is 
removed from representation shall deliver all files, notes, documents and research to the successor 
attorney within 15 days after notice from the successor attorney.”). 
 152. See McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 549-55 
(discussing criticisms of judicial monitoring). 
 153. See, e.g., Barbara R. Levine, Preventing Defense Counsel Error – An Analysis of Some 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims and Their Implications for Professional Regulation, 15 U. TOL. 
L. REV. 1275, 1433 (1984) (trial judges involved in monitoring “would have to avoid the temptation of 
getting overly involved in giving advice lest they compromise their own roles and counsel’s.”). 
 154. See McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 550 
(“effective postconviction monitoring need not involve advocacy”). 
 155. See 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37, at 973 (noting that monitoring “is not an easy task”); 
McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 570-98 (discussing 
monitoring entity’s obligation). 
 156. DEATH PENALTY INFORMATION CENTER, FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY, available at 
http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2012). 
 157. McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 553. 
 158. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.7002(2) (West 2011). 
 159.  Stephen B. Bright, Elected Judges and the Death Penalty in Texas: Why Full Habeas Corpus 
Review by Independent Federal Judges is Indispensable to Protecting Constitutional Rights, 78 TEX. L. 
REV. 1805, 1808, 1826-32 (2000); Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of 
Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 
759, 760-66 (1995). 
 160. ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 325.  Florida Supreme Court justices 
are governed by the merit selection process – initial appointment by the Governor followed by retention 
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If in the course of monitoring a judge discovers and remedies a problem with 
counsel’s performance, the judge could be perceived as soft on crime, which could 
in turn be used against her in an upcoming election.161  What judge facing re-
election in a death penalty state wants to be viewed as the obstacle standing 
between the state and the enforcement of its criminal laws?162      
The bottom line is that Florida’s monitoring failure confirms the predictions of 
those who doubted the efficacy of judicial monitoring.  Whatever the reason for the 
failure,163 a change in the monitoring entity is necessary.  The risk of insufficient 
monitoring by the judiciary is simply too high.  Thus, as has been long-
recommended by the ABA, the monitoring entity must be an independent entity. 
Florida has independent defender organizations  – the two remaining CCRCs – 
but under the ABA’s Guidelines for the Appointment and Performance of Defense 
Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (ABA Guidelines),164 the two CCRCs are 
prohibited from monitoring the attorneys in their respective offices, as it would 
constitute a conflict of interest.165  Instead, to comply with the ABA Guidelines, 
Florida must establish an “[i]ndependent [a]uthority . . . run by defense attorneys 
with demonstrated knowledge and expertise in capital representation”166 to conduct 
the monitoring function, and it must be the same entity that appoints, recruits and 
trains counsel.167  Currently no such entity exists in the State of Florida.168 
                                                                                                                 
elections.   FLA. CONST. art. V, §10(a), (b).  Trial and appellate court judges are elected unless voters in 
their jurisdiction choose to use the merit selection process.  Id.  See also ABA FLORIDA DEATH 
PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 312-15 (explaining in detail election and merit selection process in 
Florida).  The ABA acknowledged that while “the merit selection system . . . generally mutes the 
influence of political dollars on these judicial seats[,]  . . . the merit selection process is not immune 
from politicization . . . .”  Id. at 328.   
 161. Judicial decisions in death penalty cases have been fodder for political attack during retention 
elections in Florida.  ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 329-30. 
 162. See Andrew Hammel, Effective Performance Guarantees for Capital State Post-Conviction 
Counsel: Cutting the Gordian Knot, 5 J. App. Prac. & Process 347, 388 (2003) (challenging wisdom of 
this author’s proposed monitoring requirement, arguing that in states where “courts have shown no 
hesitancy to affirm clearly incompetent representation . . . it is certainly questionable whether a high 
court or appointed commission would recognize a truly exacting standard of competent performance—
and even whether it would risk delaying an execution to remedy a violation of a proper standard.”) 
(emphasis added).  
 163. Without further detailed study, we will not know for certain why “the court’s monitoring of the 
performance of counsel . . . has not occurred.”  AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 20, at 1.  The 
potential explanations discussed above represent some reasonable possibilities.  
 164. 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37. 
 165. Id. at 949.  
 166. Id. at 945 (Guideline 3.1(C)(2)). 
 167. Id. at 944-46 (Guideline 3.1). 
 168. The appointment and recruiting functions currently are performed by separate entities in Florida, 
neither of which is “run by defense attorneys.”  Id. at 945.  The Florida Supreme Court appoints the 
CCRC to serve as post-conviction counsel in the geographic areas governed by the two remaining 
CCRCs, and the trial court appoints registry counsel in the geographic area governed by the pilot 
project.  FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.851(b).   The Executive Director of the Commission on Capital Cases, 
which was defunded in 2011, used to be responsible for recruiting counsel for the registry.  See supra 
note 58.  As of July 1, 2011, the Justice Administrative Commission, which consists of two State 
Attorneys and two Public Defenders, is responsible for recruiting attorneys for the registry and 
maintaining the registry.  See generally, JUSTICE ADMINISTRATIVE COMMISSION, supra note 58.  
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2.  Lack of a Properly Designed Monitoring System 
In order to effectively exercise the monitoring function, the monitoring entity 
needs a detailed monitoring system – a blueprint explaining precisely how to 
uncover signs of both inability to perform and actual or threatened poor 
performance.169  This blueprint encourages not only thorough monitoring in an 
individual case, but also consistent monitoring across all cases.   Unfortunately, no 
such blueprint existed in Florida, as the Auditor General discovered during his 
review of the pilot program.170  And without any system in place to guide the 
monitoring entity (and remind it of the duty to monitor), it is no wonder the 
statutorily required monitoring did not occur in Florida.  
Going forward, Florida (preferably through the monitoring entity) must 
establish a monitoring system designed to help the monitoring entity execute its 
function.171  The system must include a protocol for both reactive and proactive 
monitoring; it must establish a plan not only for responding to complaints or 
observations regarding an inability to perform or questionable performance 
(reactive), but also for spotting signs of potential and actual problems with 
counsel’s performance (proactive).172  The plan for reactive monitoring should 
                                                                                                                 
  In its review of Florida’s system, the ABA found no specific “training requirement[] for” CCRC 
attorneys  “[a]part from the general CLE requirements for all attorneys.”  ABA FLORIDA DEATH 
PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 166 (internal citation omitted).  With respect to registry attorneys, 
the ABA found only the requirement that they must “‘have attended within the last year a continuing 
legal education program of at least 10 hours duration devoted specifically to the defense of capital cases, 
if available.”  Id. (quoting FLA. STAT. § 27.710(1)).  It is unclear whether the 10-hour program must be 
completed within the year before joining the registry, or every year.  There appears to be no single entity 
charged with offering training programs for capital post-conviction counsel.  Id. at 166 (listing various 
providers of relevant CLE programs, including the Florida Bar Association, the Florida Public 
Defenders Association, and the Commission on Capital Cases). 
 169. See 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37, at 970 (explaining that the monitoring entity “should 
establish and publicize a regular procedure for investigating and resolving any complaints made by 
judges, clients, attorneys, or others that defense counsel failed to provide high quality legal 
representation.”); id. at 973 (noting that “[t]he performance of each assigned lawyer should be subject to 
systematic review based upon publicized standards and procedures.”).  ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY 
REPORT, supra note 13, at x (recommending that “Florida should adopt  . . . attorney monitoring 
procedures that are consistent with the ABA Guidelines”); cf The Spangenberg Group, State Indigent 
Defense Commissions, THE SPANGENBERG REPORT 20 (Dec. 2006) (arguing that “effective oversight of 
an indigent defense system [requires] meaningful standards and guidelines with which to judge the 
adequacy of the indigent defense providers and individual attorneys”). 
 170. AUDITOR GENERAL’S REPORT, supra note 20, at 16 (“Our discussions with the Department of 
Legal Affairs, the Executive Director, and registry attorneys disclosed that a system for monitoring the 
performance of attorneys assigned to capital defendants has not been established . . . .”). 
 171. See 2003 ABA Guidelines, supra note 37, at 970, 973. 
 172. The 2003 ABA Guidelines explicitly call for an established system for reactive monitoring, 
requiring the monitoring entity to “establish and publicize a regular procedure for investigating and 
resolving any complaints made by judges, client, attorneys, or others that defense counsel failed to 
provide high quality legal representation.”  Id. at 970 (Guideline 7.1(B)).  In the Commentary to 
Guideline 7.1, the ABA recognizes that monitoring must also be proactive:   
While the [monitoring entity] should investigate and maintain records regarding any 
complaints . . . , an effective attorney-monitoring program in death penalty matters 
should go considerably beyond these activities.  The performance of each assigned 
lawyer should be subject to systematic review based upon publicized standards and 
procedures.  
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require thorough investigation of the complaint, with mandatory follow-up on any 
information that might suggest incompetence.  By its nature, reactive monitoring 
would be limited to the topic(s) raised in the complaint or noticed by the 
monitoring entity during its investigation. 
Proactive monitoring requires a broader scope, as it involves a review of all 
three basic duties of post-conviction counsel.  As a result, the protocol will by 
necessity be detailed.173  It should, for example, establish a schedule for 
monitoring, specifying not only when the monitoring should occur, but also which 
aspect of counsel’s performance must be examined at each stage of post-conviction 
review.   The protocol should list the relevant performance issues and should 
identify the signs of both competent and incompetent performance with respect to 
those issues.174  It should also designate methods for gathering the relevant 
information, such as holding conferences or sending checklists to counsel.175  If it 
recommends the latter, the protocol should include formulated checklists applicable 
for each stage of the litigation.   Finally, the protocol should outline the actions the 
monitoring entity ought to take once it spots a problem, including seeking remedies 
from the court.  For example, if the monitoring entity discovers a problem with 
counsel’s understanding of a filing deadline, the protocol should direct the 
monitoring entity to correct the misunderstanding before counsel misses the 
deadline.  And, in the case of an actual untimely filing, the protocol might instruct 
the monitoring entity to seek an extension of time and, depending on the 
circumstances, removal of counsel.176    
Most of the monitoring will be done at the trial court level because the 
investigation, discovery of claims, and raising them in a timely state petition all 
occur at the beginning of post-conviction review.   But monitoring must continue 
throughout post-conviction review, as any claims not properly preserved (raised 
and considered on the merits) at the state post-conviction level will be lost at the 
federal habeas level.177  As a result, the plan must require the monitoring entity to 
follow counsel’s efforts to timely appeal any adverse rulings on the state petition.178  
                                                                                                                 
Id. at 973 (emphasis added).  While the 2003 ABA Guidelines recommend specific performance 
standards, they do not recommend specific procedures for the monitoring entity to follow.  The 
recommendations in this article represent just a beginning sketch of the blueprint that is necessary for 
meaningful monitoring. 
 173. The 2003 ABA Guidelines recommend the creation of “standards of performance” to which the 
monitoring entity should refer when “assessing the . . . performance of counsel.”  Id. at 989 (Guideline 
10.1).  See also id. at 992 (performance standards “should . . .  be utilized  . . . when monitoring the 
performance of counsel”).  The 2003 ABA Guidelines set forth detailed minimum performance 
standards, but encourage the monitoring entity to add to them.  Id. at 989.  
 174. For a list of performance standards to guide the monitoring entity, see id. at 1079-87 (Guideline 
10.15.1).  See also McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 570-83 
(discussing how monitoring entity can spot signs of competent and incompetent performance). 
 175. For a discussion of how the monitoring entity should gather the relevant information, see 
McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, supra note 34, at 583-89. 
 176. See id. at 597-98 (explaining possible remedies). 
 177. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2012); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 731, 752-53 (1991).  
 178. See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.851(d)(3) (state habeas petition filed in Florida Supreme Court with 
appeal from trial court’s decision on post-conviction motion); FLA. R. APP. P. 9.110(b), 9.140(b)(1)(D), 
(b)(3) (rules for appealing capital post-conviction motions).  In Florida, state post-conviction motions 
are separate from state habeas petitions, with the former originating in the trial court and the latter 
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And since Florida law requires registry attorneys to continue representing “the 
capital defendant throughout all post-conviction capital collateral proceedings, 
including federal habeas corpus proceedings,”179 the monitoring plan absolutely 
must include instructions to monitor counsel’s compliance with the duty to file a 
timely federal habeas petition.   
C.  Implications of Florida’s Monitoring Failure 
Had Florida complied with the first two essential elements of a constitutionally 
meaningful monitoring system, the general monitoring failure noticed by the 
Auditor General very likely would not have occurred.  Using Albert Holland’s case 
as an example, a committed monitoring entity following a detailed proactive 
monitoring strategy very likely would have intervened in time to prevent the 
missed federal deadline.180  While the Florida Supreme Court engaged in some 
limited reactive monitoring in connection with Holland’s second removal motion, it 
failed to proactively monitor for signs of other potential problems.  A trained 
monitoring entity would have inquired whether counsel was aware of the one-year 
statute of limitations and whether counsel understood how to calculate its running 
(and tolling).181  It also would have gathered information about counsel’s plan for 
filing a timely petition and corrected counsel’s course if it appeared the plan would 
lead to a late filing.   
In the absence of such monitoring and through no fault of his own, Albert 
Holland missed his federal filing deadline.  Fortunately for Holland, after years of 
litigation things finally worked out (for now at least).  On remand182 the district 
court found “extraordinary circumstances” warranting equitable tolling, allowed 
                                                                                                                 
originating in the Florida Supreme Court.  Thus, the monitoring entity must also track counsel’s efforts 
to file a timely state habeas petition.  See FLA. R. CRIM. P. 3.851(d)(3). 
 179. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.711(2) (West 2011); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.710(3) (West 2011) 
(“[I]f appointed to represent a person in postconviction capital collateral proceedings, [the attorney] 
shall continue such representation under the terms and conditions set forth in § 27.711 until the sentence 
is reversed, reduced, or carried out or unless permitted to withdraw from representation by the trial 
court.”). 
 180. Using the documents contained in the Joint Appendix as a guide, reactive monitoring in 
response to Holland’s removal motions would not have revealed any problems with counsel’s ability to 
perform or compliance with his duties to investigate the case and raise all meritorious claims.  In fact, 
Holland presented similar allegations to the Florida Bar Association, but it denied the complaint as 
meritless.  Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 65-66.  In his removal motions, Holland complained of a 
lack of communication and failure to raise claims, but in his response to Holland’s second removal 
motion, counsel explained that he “communicated with Mr. Holland before, during and after the 3.851 
motion was filed; before, during and after evidentiary hearings; and prior to filing appellate briefs and 
habeas corpus pleadings on the claims which, in [his] professional judgment, may be advanced in good 
faith.”  Id. at 38.  Counsel also sent letters to Holland explaining not only that some claims are not 
cognizable on collateral review, but also precisely why his claims either could not, or should not, be 
raised.  See supra note 13.  And counsel made every effort to preserve the claims Holland sought to 
raise, first by seeking to adopt Holland’s supplemental pleading (which the trial court rejected), and then 
by successfully supplementing the record with documents prepared by Holland.  See supra note 13.    
 181. Such inquiry should take place at the beginning of state post-conviction review and periodically 
throughout the process. 
    182. After the Supreme Court’s remand, the Eleventh Circuit “remand[ed] th[e] case to the district 
court for fact finding and further proceedings—including, if it is necessary, an evidentiary hearing—
consistent with the Supreme Court’s instructions.”  Holland v. Florida, 613 F.3d 1053 (11th Cir. 2010). 
510 MAINE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:2 
Holland to file an amended petition,183 and then granted the petition in part and 
denied it in part.184 But it is worth emphasizing that Holland is one of the lucky 
few, for the Supreme Court has held that “‘a garden variety claim of excusable 
neglect’ such as a simple ‘miscalculation’ that leads a lawyer to miss a filing 
deadline does not warrant equitable tolling.”185  There likely remains a number of 
unlucky capital inmates who pursued state post-conviction remedies during the 
period of Florida’s monitoring failure and who missed their federal filing deadlines 
because of attorney negligence, all of whom would be ineligible for equitable 
tolling.186  
Monitoring failures can also have a significant impact on the government.  
While proper monitoring keeps the case moving towards the finish line,187 failure to 
monitor can aggravate a state’s interests in avoiding delay and achieving finality.  
Indeed, had Albert Holland’s federal petition been filed on time (by December 13, 
2005),188 federal habeas review likely would be completed or would be near 
completion.189  Instead, Holland and the State of Florida spent years fighting about 
equitable tolling.  And even though the district court resolved the equitable tolling 
issue and ruled on the merits of Holland’s claims, the State still faces delay 
occasioned by appellate review of the district court’s decision.190  Moreover, 
                                                                                                                 
    183. Holland v. Florida, No. 06-20182 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 22, 2010) (order granting equitable tolling and 
allowing amended petition). 
    184. Holland v. Tucker, 2012 WL 1103294 at *30, *56 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (granting relief for denial of 
right to self representation and ordering new trial).  
 185. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2564 (quoting Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 96 
(1990); Lawrence v. Florida, 549 U.S. 327, 336 (2007)).  
 186. Such cases likely exist.  During its review of Florida’s death penalty system, the ABA noted that 
“registry attorneys in at least twelve separate cases filed their clients’ state post-conviction motions or 
federal habeas corpus petitions between two months to three years after the applicable filing deadline.”  
ABA FLORIDA DEATH PENALTY REPORT, supra note 13, at 182 (internal citation omitted). 
 187. Except in circumstances where the monitoring entity prevents attorney conduct that would have 
triggered a delay (think equitable tolling), monitoring probably does not reduce delay.  But it should not 
aggravate the state’s interest in finality.  McConville, Scope of Constitutional Obligation to Monitor, 
supra note 34, at 570 (“[d]uring-performance reviews . . . pose no greater risk to finality than that which 
exists by virtue of the postconviction process itself . . . . Monitoring does not increase th[e] opportunity 
[for relief], but rather protects it by ensuring, to the extent possible, that counsel acts with a certain level 
of competence throughout the postconviction proceeding.”).  
 188. Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2556. 
 189. A recent study revealed that in capital cases it took an average of 28.7 months – a little over two 
years – to resolve a federal habeas petition in federal district court.  NANCY J. KING ET AL., FINAL 
TECHNICAL REPORT:  HABEAS LITIGATION IN U.S. DISTRICT COURTS:  AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF 
HABEAS CORPUS CASES FILED BY STAT PRISONERS UNDER THE ANTITERRORISM AND EFFECTIVE 
DEATH PENALTY ACT OF 1996 38-39 (2007), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/ 
grants/219559.pdf (measuring the time from “the date of the first docket entry [to] the date of 
termination in district court”).  Using this average as a guide, Holland would have finished district court 
review in the early part of 2008.  Review in the court of appeals and the Supreme Court reasonably 
could have been finished within four years, putting us in early 2012.   Indeed, consideration of Holland’s 
January 2006 petition – from the filing in district court to the Supreme Court’s decision regarding 
equitable tolling – took four and one-half years.  See Joint Appendix, supra note 2, at 83 (petition filed 
January 19, 2006); Holland, 130 S. Ct. at 2549 (decision dated June 14, 2010). 
    190. Both Holland and the State of Florida appealed the district court’s decision.  See Holland v. 
Tucker, 2012 WL 1193294 (S.D. Fla. 2012), appeal docketed, No. 12-12404-P (11th Cir. May 7, 2012); 
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additional delay will result from the retrial should the appellate courts affirm the 
district court’s decision in favor of Holland.     In short, capital petitioners are not 
the only ones losing out because of the monitoring failure in Florida. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Albert Holland brought his complaints about his counsel to the right party – 
the party that had a statutory (and constitutional) obligation to monitor counsel’s 
performance.  Unfortunately, the Florida Supreme Court failed to meet that 
obligation.  True, it reviewed Holland’s two motions to remove counsel from his 
case – even ordering responses from the parties after the second motion.  But it 
failed to proactively monitor counsel’s performance for compliance with his duty 
to file a timely federal habeas petition.  Despite its recognition of the obligation to 
monitor, the court failed to detect and prevent a major (but preventable) error – the 
failure to file a timely federal habeas petition. 
To some, Albert Holland’s case might call into question the efficacy of 
monitoring as a tool to improve the performance of capital post-conviction counsel 
– a tool that I have argued is constitutionally required to protect the statutory right 
to capital post-conviction counsel.  That the case took place in Florida – a state that 
requires monitoring and relies on monitoring as “the sole method of assuring 
adequa[te] representation”191 – arguably makes the question even more 
pronounced.  If Albert Holland could not get quality monitoring in Florida, then 
maybe quality monitoring is an unattainable goal.  
As explained in this Article, however, the monitoring failure in Holland (and 
in Florida in general) does not undermine reliance on monitoring as a way of 
promoting effective assistance of capital post-conviction counsel.  Instead, the 
monitoring failure in Holland was the result of two things:  Florida’s utilization of 
the judiciary as the monitoring entity and its failure to establish a detailed 
monitoring system to guide the monitoring entity in performing its functions.  
While the Florida judiciary undoubtedly possesses the requisite expertise to 
perform the monitoring function, its literal failure to monitor – not just in Holland 
but in post-conviction cases generally – confirms the doubts about the wisdom of 
relying on the judiciary to perform the monitoring function.  For whatever reason – 
lack of time, concern about abandoning a neutral role or concern about reelection 
prospects, etcetera – the judiciary is not the best option for a monitoring entity.  
Instead, as the ABA has long recommended, monitoring must be performed by an 
independent entity that is committed to the monitoring enterprise. 
But even with such an entity, meaningful monitoring cannot occur without an 
established monitoring plan detailing precisely how the monitoring entity ought to 
exercise the monitoring function at each stage of the post-conviction process.  
Indeed, the complete absence of such a plan decreases the chances that monitoring 
will occur in any form, let alone a meaningful form.   
So in the end Holland teaches us an important lesson:  Florida unfortunately 
set itself up for failure.   
                                                                                                                 
Holland v. Tucker, 2012 WL 1193294 (S.D. Fla. 2012), cross appeal docketed, No. 12-404-P (11th Cir. 
May 11, 2012). 
 191. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 27.7002(2) (West 2011). 
